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ANTITRUST-THE JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
§ 2(a) CLARIFIED: GULF OIL CORP. V. COPP
PAVING CO., INC.
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc.,' the United States
Supreme Court considered the interstate commerce jurisdictional
requirements of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act2 for the first time in over twenty years.3 During
this period, the lower federal courts frequently construed the subject
matter jurisdiction requirements of § 2(a)4 with inconsistent results.
1 95 S. Ct. 392 (1974).
2 Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), formerly Ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730
(1914). The Clayton Act was amended in 1936 by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1970), formerly Ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936).
' The last time the Supreme Court considered the jurisdictional reach of the
Robinson-Patman § 2(a) "in commerce" provision was in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread
Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). See notes 50-60 and accompanying text infra.
The following circuit and district court cases have construed the "in commerce"
provision of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act since the Supreme Court last considered the
issue: Scranton Constr. Co., Inc. v. Litton Indus. Leasing Corp., 494 F.2d 778 (5th Cir.
1974), U.S. App. pending, 43 U.S.L.W. 3095 (1974); Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v.
General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146
(1974); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077
(1972); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd en banc, 483 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d
175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc.,
417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969); Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785
(10th Cir. 1967); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 959 (1965); Fort Lauderdale v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., 329 F.2d 871 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964); United States v. South Fla. Asphalt Co., 329
F.2d 860 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); Shreveport Macaroni Mfg. Co.
v. FTC, 321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 375 U.S. 971 (1964); Willard Dairy
Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 934 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block &
Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Central
Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 257 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1968); Miles v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1973); In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 350 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Papex Prods.
Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 138 (1974); Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.
Ala. 1971); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 330 F.
Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972); Flotken's West, Inc.
v. National Food Stores, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Liquilux Gas Servs.
v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F. Supp. 414 (D.P.R. 1969); Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo.
940 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
This lack of harmony among the lower courts may be attributed, at
least in part, to the equivocal nature5 of Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread
Co.,' the Court's last ruling on the jurisdictional scope of § 2(a). The
question which the federal courts faced for so long without Supreme
Court guidance was whether or not Congress, by enacting § 2(a),
intended to exercise its plenary power under the Constitution to regu-
late commerce.'
The problem of determining Congress's intent in enacting § 2(a)
springs from the vague and complicated language used in that statute
to establish federal jurisdiction in cases of price discrimination.8 Spe-
cifically, to fall within the Act's purview one must, first, be "engaged
in commerce;" second, one must discriminate in price between differ-
ent purchasers of commodities "in the course of such commerce;"
and, third, at least one of the purchases involved in such discrimina-
tion must be "in commerce." 9 Although the term "commerce" is
defined by § 1 of the Clayton Act,'" courts have never adopted a
Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148 (D. Minn. 1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir.
1968); Baldwin Hills Bldg. Materials Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 202 (C.D. Cal. 1968); LaPointe v. Schweigert Meat Co., 282 F. Supp. 974 (D.
Minn. 1966); Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 278 F. Supp. 938
(C.D. Cal. 1967); Ingram v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 259 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.M. 1966);
Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1965); Cream Crest-Blanding
Dairies, Inc. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 243 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd
per curiam, 370 F.2d 332 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967); Gaylord Shops,
Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F. Supp.
400 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Davidson v. Kansas City Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Mo.
1962), rev'd, 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964); Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F.
Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
1 E.q., Littlejohn v. Shell Oil, 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd en banc, 483 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973), and cases cited therein.
348 U.S. 115 (1954).
Both positions have been advocated strongly. Compare E. KINTNER, A.
RoBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 80 (1970) with Note, The Commerce Requirement of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (1971).
1 Courts have not infrequently bemoaned the "infelicitous language," Automatic
Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 78 (1953), and "vague and general" wording, FTC
v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 481 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting), of the Robinson-
Patman Act.
The relevant portion of the statute reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrim-
ination are in commerce ....
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
,o 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
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uniform interpretation of the "in commerce" language of § 2(a).
Rather, there have been two rival interpretations of the "in com-
merce" standard for jurisdiction under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act.
Some courts have ruled that Congress exercised its full power to
regulate commerce in § 2(a) and therefore intended that the "affect-
ing commerce" doctrine apply to cases arising under that section.1 '
Under this theory, commercial activities which are purely intrastate
. The "affecting commerce" doctrine has been most extensively defined in Kat-
zenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n., 336
U.S. 460 (1949); and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The following cases have
applied the "affecting commerce" doctrine to § 2(a); Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co.,
105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.,
178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949); Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 344
F. Supp. 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1972); General Shale Products v. Struck Constr. Co., 37 F.
Supp. 598 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
780 (1943); Abouaf v. Spreckels Co., 26 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Calif. 1939). Cf. United
States v. South Fla. Asphalt Co., 329 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1964); Central Ice Cream Co.
v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 257 F.2d 417 (7th- Cir. 1958); White Bear Theatre Corp.
v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942); Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery Shale
Brick Corp., 46 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1942); Alabama Independent Serv. Station
Ass'n., Inc. v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939). See also C.
AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, 15-17 (2d ed. 1959); W. PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT: WHAT YOU CAN AND CANNOT Do UNDER THIS LAW 225-26 (1938). But see W.
PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Aar 46-47 (1963); 2 H. TOULMIN, A
TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRuST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 7.5 (1949); Blackford, A
Survey of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 NOTRE DAME L. 285, 291 (1966);
Dixon, Practice and Procedure Before the Federal Trade Commission, 9 N.Y.L.F. 31,
34-35 (1963); Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Legislation, 25 FED.
B.J. 282, 299 (1965); Haslett, Price Discriminations and Their Justifications Under the
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 46 MICH. L. REv. 450, 452-53 (1948); Note, The Com-
merce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1255 (1971);
Comment, Robinson-Patman Act-Section 2(a)-Primary Line Competition-
Discriminatory Sales Need Not Cross State Lines, 9 N.Y.L.F. 93, 97 (1963).
A number of cases decided under § 2(c) and (e) of the Clayton Act lend support
to the proposition that the "affecting commerce" doctrine is incorporated into § 2(a).
Skinner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC,
156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947); Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945);
Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939); Liquilux Gas Servs. v.
Tropical Gas Co., 303 F. Supp. 414 (D.P.R. 1969); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 81 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. N.Y. 1948). But see E. KINTNER,
A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 84 (1970). The following cases decided under §§ 2(c) and
(e) indicate that Robinson-Patman jurisdiction may be based on the "affecting com-
merce" doctrine: Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); Rangen, Inc. v.
Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966);
Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943); Quality
Bakers v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940); Body-Steffner Co. v. Flotill Prods., Inc.,
63 Cal. App. 2d 555, 147 P.2d 84 (1944).
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are nevertheless within Congress's regulatory power if they hinder or
otherwise affect interstate commerce. 12 Other courts, however, have
adopted a narrower reading of § 2(a), requiring that before the statute
applies there must be a showing that at least one of the commodities
for which a discriminatory price is charged has crossed a state line.,3
This is the so-called "state line" test.
These, in essence, were the conflicting theories offered by the
parties in Copp Paving. In deciding Copp Paving, the Supreme Court
eliminated much of the uncertainty that has surrounded the "in com-
merce" jurisdictional requirements of § 2(a) by rejecting the "affect-
ing commerce" interpretation, and adopting the more restrictive
"state line" test. Insofar as it clarifies obscure statutory language,
Copp Paving is of sweeping importance for both the private § 2(a)
plaintiff and the Federal Trade Commission."
12 For the furthest development and clearest articulation of the doctrine, see cases
cited in note 11 supra.
,1 Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.
1973); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd en banc 483 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger,
Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969); Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d
4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d
873 (5th Cir. 1968); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967);
Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964); Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963) (Black,
J., dissenting); Miles v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Rosemound Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 330 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1971); Flotken's
West, Inc. v. National Food Stores, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Liquilux
Gas Servs. v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F. Supp. 414 (D.P.R. 1969); Baldwin Hills Bldg.
Materials Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 202 (C.D. Cal. 1968);
LaPointe v. Schweigert Meat Co., 282 F. Supp. 974 (D. Minn. 1966); Ingram v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 259 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.M. 1966); Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp., 244
F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1965); Cream Crest-Blanding Dairies, Inc. v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 243 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. Mich. 1965); Shlomchik v. Hygrade Bakery Co.,
1953 Trade Cas. 67,632 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.
Cal. 1951); Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950); Lewis v. Shell
Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill. 1943); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 42 F.
Supp. 723 (M.D. Ga. 1942). See also E. KINTNER, A. ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 80-81
(1970); 16c [J. von Kalinowski, Business Organizations: Antitrust Laws and Trade
Regulation § 26.02 (1971); Kemker, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 155, 158-59 (1961) Kintner and Mayne, Interstate Commerce
Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 58 GEO. L. REV. 1117
(1970); Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities in Commerce: Jurisdictional Cri-
teria Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 67 YALE L.J. 11.55, 1168 (1958).
" Although the Justice Department and FTC share responsibility for enforcing
the Robinson-Patman Act, in practice most of this responsibility devolves upon the
FTC. E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 286 (1970).
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The respondent, Copp Paving Company, Inc., originally brought
suit against Union Oil Co. and its wholly-owned subsidiary Industrial
Asphalt, and Edgington Oil Company. Copp Paving alleged infrac-
tions of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,' 5 §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton
Act,'" and § 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act. All parties to the suit were engaged in the asphaltic
concrete, or "black top," industry.17 Petitioners Gulf Oil, Union Oil
and Edgington Oil were producers of liquid asphalt. Gulf sold all of
its liquid asphalt to its subsidiary Industrial Asphalt which operated
fifty-five "hot plants" in California, Arizona, and Nevada." Although
both Gulf and Industrial Asphalt were engaged in interstate com-
merce, Copp was unable to point to any particular sale from an indi-
vidual hot plant which had crossed a state boundary.'9 Union Oil sold
liquid asphalt to its subsidiary Sully-Miller which operated eleven
hot plants in Los Angeles and Orange Counties, California. Edging-
ton Oil Company sold liquid asphalt to Sully-Miller, Industrial As-
phalt and Copp Paving Company. The respondent, Copp Paving,
operated only one hot plant and was in direct competition with the
Los Angeles area hot plants owned by Sully-Miller and Industrial
Asphalt. Significantly, Sully-Miller, Industrial Asphalt and Copp
sold a large proportion of their asphaltic concrete to contractors en-
gaged in the building and repair of California's interstate highways."
,1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1970).
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 14 & 18 (1970).
'7 Asphaltic concrete has two main ingredients. In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases Relating to Copp Paving Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,013, at
92,206 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Liquid asphalt, a petroleum derivative, comprises about 5%
of asphaltic concrete, and the remainder is made up of various fillers such as sand and
gravel. The liquid asphalt and fillers are combined at temperatures of approximately
375°F in what is termed a "hot plant." The asphaltic concrete is then delivered to
road construction sites where it is placed at a temperature of about 2750 F. The
necessity of maintaining the product's heat, its great weight, and the low cost and
ready availability of its main component make it uneconomical to deliver beyond a
limited radius. A radius of thirty-five miles seems to have been the area of potential
delivery for the hot plants in Copp Paving. Because the actual construction of the
entire interstate highway system is performed by the states, it seems most unlikely
that a contract for road paving would ever involve a particular hot plant in deliveries
of its product across a state line. Thus, the singular characteristics of asphaltic con-
crete manufacture and sale combine to make it an almost exclusively intrastate enter-
prise. This fact made it highly unlikely that interstate commerce played any role in
the production and sale of asphaltic concrete as far as the situation in Copp Paving
was concerned.
95 S.Ct. at 395.
" Id. at 396 n.2.
Id. at 395-96.
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The basis of Copp's treble-damage claim under § 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act was twofold. First, Copp alleged that Sully-
Miller and Industrial Asphalt were selling their asphaltic concrete for
higher prices in those areas where they did not compete with Copp
than in the Los Angeles area where they did so compete, thereby
causing primary injury at the seller's level." Second, Copp alleged
that Union, Gulf, and Edgington sold liquid asphalt to Sully-Miller
and Industrial for lower prices than they charged Copp, thereby caus-
ing secondary injury at the buyer's level.2 The district court severed
Copp's claim pertaining to the sale of asphaltic concrete from its
claim concerning liquid asphalt and dismissed the asphaltic concrete
claim for failure to show subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the
commercial activities of which Copp compained neither crossed a
state line, nor affected interstate commerce.2 On interlocutory ap-
peal from this dismissal,24 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court.
25
The Ninth Circuit concluded that through their production of
asphalt for use in interstate highways, the parties in Copp Paving
sufficiently affected interstate commerce to be "in commerce" for the
purposes of § 2(a). The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion in two
2 "Primary-line injury at the seller's level" describes the situation in which two
sellers are competing for one geographical market, but only one of them has a position
in some other geographical market. If the seller with access to two markets cuts his
price in the area where he competes with the other seller and keeps his prices high in
that area where he has no competition, then a "primary line" injury is said to have
occurred. E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 93 (1970). The Robinson-Patman
Act was primarily designed to combat "secondary-line" injury, see note 22 infra, but
because the original § 2 of the Clayton Act addressed primary-line price discrimina-
tion, the Court has held that primary line injury is still forbidden. FTC v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 544 (1960).
"Secondary-line injury at the buyer's level" refers to the situation where two
buyers have a common supplier and also compete for the same customers. If the seller
gives a lower price to one buyer than to the other, this saving can be passed on to the
consumer and the favored buyer has a stronger position in the market than the one
paying the higher price. When this happens, "secondary-line injury at the buyer's
level" is said to have occurred. E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 93-96 (1970).
The Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act was designed specifically to
redress the grievance of grocery wholesalers and retailers against the emerging power
of the food chains. The large food chains used their great buying power to compel
producers to sell to them at a very low price, and passed this lower price on to the
consumer. F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr, Ch. 1
(1962). Thus, elimination of secondary-line injury at the buyer's level is the primary
goal of § 2(a).
2 1972 Trade Cas. 74,013, at 92,208 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
24 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
2 In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 287 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1973).
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steps. First, the court determined that the "affecting commerce"
doctrine could validly be applied to the "in commerce" language of
§ 2(a). Second, the court decided that the allegedly discriminatory
sales in Copp Paving actually affected interstate commerce since the
goods sold were for use in the construction and repair of interstate
highways.
In ruling that the "in commerce" jurisdictional test of § 2(a) could
be satisfied by sales which merely "affect" interstate commerce, the
Ninth Circuit relied on two independent propositions. First, the court
posited that the phrase "in commerce" should have the same mean-
ing whenever it is used in federal statutes. Pursuant to this premise,
the Ninth Circuit accepted cases decided under the "in commerce"
jurisdictional provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)0 as
relevant precedent for interpreting the same phrase in the Robinson-
Patman Act.? In two of these cases the Supreme Court has used the
"affecting commerce" doctrine to rule that those who either operate
and maintain or manufacture materials for repairing interstate roads
are "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of the FLSA. Rely-
ing on these precedents, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the "affect-
ing commerce" doctrine could also be applied to the "in commerce"
language of § 2(a).
The second proposition upon which the Ninth Circuit relied in
ruling that the "affecting commerce" doctrine satisfied § 2(a) juris-
dictional requirements was that because the Robinson-Patman Act
was passed to augment the purposes of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
the jurisdictional scope of the two laws should be similarly con-
29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970).
487 F.2d at 205.
21 Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953); Overstreet v. North Shore
Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943).
" 487 F.2d at 206. The circuit court's conclusion that the Robinson-Patman Act
complements the purposes of the Sherman Antitrust Act is questionable at best.
While the Supreme Court has ruled that the Sherman Act encourages a situation where
individual businesses have the freedom to determine their own pricing policies, Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951), United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Robinson-Patman Act arguably
denies this freedom and thus dictates a form of price fixing. This basic policy conflict
has been recognized by the Supreme Court. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S.
231 (1951). This policy difference is partially explicable in terms of the extreme circum-
stances which produced the Robinson-Patman Act.
Although a choice between these divergent views was an essential part of the
Ninth Circuit's disposition of Copp Paving, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue
explicitly but rather seemed to adopt the position that the two acts have different
purposes by implication. 95 S.Ct. at 398.
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strued.29 Thus, because the prohibitions of the Sherman Act have
been interpreted as coextensive with the full scope of Congress's con-
stitutional power to regulate commerce, 0 the Ninth Circuit in Copp
Paving ruled that § 2(a) should also reach discriminatory pricing
arrangements which affect interstate commerce1
Having concluded that the "in commerce" jurisdictional test of §
2(a) could be satisfied by sales which merely affect commerce, the
Ninth Circuit had to determine whether the allegedly discriminatory
sales in Copp Paving actually affected interstate commerce. Because
the plaintiff Copp had been unable to show that the defendants'
pricing activities had in fact affected interstate commerce,3 2 the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the requisite effect was shown as a matter
of law. The court reasoned that because highways are instrumental-
ities of interstate commerce, and because there is a close connection
between highways and the asphalt needed to build them the sales of
asphalt were "in commerce" purely because of this "nexus with an
instrumentality of interstate commerce .... -31
Although the Ninth Circuit ruled that Copp had established sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman, Clayton and Robinson-
Patman Acts, the Supreme Court limited its grant of certiorari to the
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act claims, recognizing that an ap-
parent conflict among the circuits had arisen concerning the criteria
necessary to establish jurisdiction under the two acts.3 4 Ultimately,
however, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the Clayton Act
question,'- and limited its decision solely to the issue of the require-
ments for § 2(a) jurisdiction. On this issue, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and adopted the "state line"
test.
In overruling the Ninth Circuit's decision in Copp Paving, the
Supreme Court rejected the circuit court's analogies with the FLSA
and the Sherman Act. Rather, the Supreme Court ruled that § 2(a)
must be read as literally as possible and that any ambiguities should
be resolved by reference to Congress's intention in enacting the
" Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); Mandeville Island Farm, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
3, 487 F.2d at 204.
32 1972 Trade Cas. 74,013, at 92,207 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
3 487 F.2d at 206.
1' 95 S.Ct. at 397.
11 The Court declined to rule on the issue of whether the "affecting commerce"
doctrine may be the basis for jurisdiction under §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act on the
ground that Copp did not allege that the defendant's pricing policies affected inter-
state commerce. 95 S.Ct. at 402.
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Robinson-Patman Act itself.6 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's
analogy between the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act for two
reasons. The first ground of rejection was the different wording of the
two statutes. The Court ruled that the language of the Sherman Act,
which forbids certain activities when they are "in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states," is more harmonious with the
"affecting commerce" doctrine than is the "in commerce" language
of § 2(a),37 and that analogies between the two statutes are therefore
invalid.
The Copp Paving Court's second reason for rejecting the Ninth
Circuit's analogy between the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts
was the Court's conclusion that while Congress intended to exercise
its commerce clause power as fully as possible in the Sherman Act,38
it intended a more restricted jurisdictional scope for the Robinson-
Patman Act. Looking at the legislative history of the Robinson-
Patman Act, the Court found affirmative indications that Congress
did not intend that the "affecting commerce" doctrine apply to §
2(a). Particularly, the Court noted that when the Patman Bill passed
in the House of Representatives, it contained the phrase "whether in
commerce or not."39 However, the Conference Committee deleted this
95 S.Ct. at 399.
3 From the wording of the statute itself, the Court concluded that the Sherman
Act protects the flow of interstate commerce from the effect of certain proscribed
behavior. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n., 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
The Court's interpretation of the "in restraint of commerce" language in the Sherman
Act was made possible by the Court's earlier ruling that in passing the Sherman Act
Congress "wanted to go to the utmost extent of its constitutional power in restraining
trust and monopoly agreements." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n.,
322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). Therefore, both the wording of the Sherman Act and the
Court's interpretation of Congress's intent in enacting it permit the regulation of even
local activities which have the effect of restraining commerce among the states.
11 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
It is important to note that the Sherman Act's jurisdictional breadth has fluctuated
with whatever a particular Court thought to be the outer limit of the congressional
commerce clause power. Compare United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13
(1895) (process of manufacturing not in interstate commerce) with Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1948) ("affecting
commerce" doctrine of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) conclusively incorpo-
rated into the Sherman Act). The point is that once the Court has determined that
Congress intended to exercise its constitutional commerce power to its fullest extent
in a particular statute, the jurisdictional scope of that statute expands with the Court's
current view of the commerce power. The problem with the Robinson-Patman Act has
been to determine how far Congress intended its jurisdiction to reach. C. AUSTIN, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION 14-18 (2d ed. 1959).
11 95 S.Ct. at 401.
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provision." Since the Court found that the phrase "whether in com-
merce or not" indicated an intent to incorporate the "affecting com-
merce" doctrine, it ruled that by deleting it Congress had rejected
this jurisdictional theory.4 '
Copp Paving's analogy between the FLSA and the Robinson-
Patman Act, which had been accepted by the Ninth Circuit, also
failed to convince the Supreme Court which found significant differ-
ences between the two statutes. The "in commerce" provisions of the
FLSA provide for coverage of employees engaged "in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce .... ,,"2 Thus, to determine
whether a claim exists under the FLSA, a court must decide whether
the goods produced by the relevant employees were either "in com-
merce" or intended "for commerce." Because what is produced "for
commerce" need not be "in commerce," the Court in Copp Paving
11 H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 6 (1936). The Court failed to note
that in agreeing to omit the "whether in commerce or not" provision, the conferees
stated: "This [the "whether in commerce or not" provision] was omitted, as the
preceding language already covers all discrimination, both interstate and intrastate,
that lie within the limits of Federal authority." Id.
1' 95 S.Ct. at 401. While the "whether in commerce or not" provision might have
facilitated an "affecting commerce" interpretation of § 2(a), the two phrases are not
identical. The difference is especially important in considering Congress's motivation
in deleting the "whether in commerce or not" provision. It has been argued that
Congress deleted the "whether in commerce or not" provision as a reaction to the
Supreme Court's declaring the National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, §§ 1-10, 48
Stat. 195 (1933) unconstitutional under the commerce clause in Schechter Poultry,
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of
1936, 23 VA. L. REV. 140, 151-52 (1936); Note, The Commerce Requirement of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1255 (1971). Certainly the Schechter
case disturbed the manner in which Congress perceived the extent of its authority
under the commerce clause. Yet even if Schechter had not been decided during Con-
gress's deliberations on the Robinson-Patman Act, the constitutional validity of its
power to regulate activities "whether in commerce or not" would have been highly
questionable. Since § 1 of the Clayton Act defines "commerce" as "interstate com-
merce," the deleted portion of the Robinson-Patman Act represented an attempt by
Congress to extend its power under the commerce clause of the Constitution whether
in interstate commerce or not. Such a law would have been a clear violation of constitu-
tional language. That the provision was dropped is, therefore, perfectly understandable
without necessarily implying anything concerning the extent to which Congress sought
to regulate price discrimination. That is, the phrase "whether in commerce or not"
could have been dropped to save the constitutionality of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Attaching more significance to removal of the provision than this would seem to im-
pute more meaning to the congressional action than it warrants. The Copp Paving
Court's interpretation of this episode in the history of the Robinson-Patman law,
however, was based upon weighty authority. C. AUSTIN, PRICE DIScRIMINATION 15 (2d
ed. 1959).
,1 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) & 209 (1970).
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rejected the argument that statutes utilizing the former as a jurisdic-
tional standard are analogous to those utilizing the latter. Rather, the
Court indicated that the phrase "in commerce" does not have a single
fixed meaning and must be interpreted in light of the policy goals and
legislative history of the particular statute in which it is found.
43
Thus, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend for the
"affecting commerce" doctrine to apply to the "in commerce" lan-
guage of the Robinson-Patman Act.44 By rejecting the applicability
of the "affecting commerce" doctrine to § 2(a), the Court seemed to
imply that the "in commerce" provision of the statute requires appli-
cation of the "state-line" test. This implication is strengthened by
the Court's discussion of Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.45 which
until Copp Paving was the Court's last word on the scope of § 2(a)
jurisdiction.
In Moore, the petitioner operated a bakery in Santa Rosa, New
Mexico and alleged § 2(a) violations against the respondent, a group
of corporations with bakeries in New Mexico as well as Texas, all of
which had interlocking directorates, common purchasing practices,
and trade name rights. From its bakery in Clovis, New Mexico, the
respondent competed with the petitioner for the bread market in
Santa Rosa. A price war between the two parties resulted, and Moore,
the smaller of the two baking concerns, was put out of business.
Moore's judgment against Mead under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act was
dismissed by the Tenth Circuit" on the ground that the sales of which
it complained neither crossed a state line nor affected interstate com-
merce. Significantly, the "affecting commerce" and "state line" doc-
trines were considered equally viable interpretations of § 2(a) at that
time. Moore appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the
Tenth Circuit.
The Moore Court did not specifically mention whether the "af-
fecting commerce" or the "state line" test governed. Instead, the
Court simply stated that the Moore situation was within the jurisdic-
tional scope of the antitrust laws." The basis for this conclusion was
not clear, since there were two possible reasons for finding Mead's
95 S.Ct. at 399.
" In addition to rejecting the applicability of the "affecting commerce" doctrine
to § 2(a), the Court criticized as overly formalistic the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the
"nexus" between asphaltic concrete and interstate highways placed the asphalt produ-
cers "in commerce" as a matter of law. 95 S.Ct. at 400.
45 348 U.S. 115 (1954). That both the respondent and the petitioner in Copp
Paving relied upon Moore indicates the degree of confusion generated by that case.
" 208 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953), noted in 54 COLUM. L. REv. 1296 (1954).
" 348 U.S. at 119.
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price discrimination within the bounds of § 2(a). First, Mead's bak-
ery in Clovis, New Mexico, in which its bread for the Santa Rosa
market was baked, also sold bread in Farwell, Texas, a town which
seemed to be but an appendage of Clovis. A solitary delivery truck
passed from the Mead bakery in Clovis, over the New Mexico-Texas
border, to retail outlets in Farwell." Because the price for which
Mead's Clovis bakery sold bread in Farwell was not reduced to the
same price as the bread it sold in Santa Rosa, the sale of Mead's
bread in Farwell constituted a purchase "in commerce" under the
strict "state-line" doctrine.
The second possible basis for the § 2(a) jurisdiction found to exist
in Moore was that where an interstate company conducts a price war
against an intrastate concern using the profits derived from its inter-
state sales, it is within the "in commerce" jurisdictional formula of
§ 2(a).49 Because of these two ways of interpreting Moore, therefore,
it was not clear whether the solitary delivery truck to Farwell, Texas
was a gratuitous supplement to the statement of facts or the key to §
2(a) subject matter jurisdiction. Some cases and commentators found
the mention of the bread truck to be an unimportant detail compared
with the more general propositions of the case." On the other hand,
some courts ruled that the broad statements in Moore were mere
dicta and that the presence of the delivery truck reconciled the case
with a literal reading of § 2(a).11 Since the Supreme Court consis-
tently denied certiorari in subsequent cases offering conflicting inter-
' Id. at 116.
4' Id. at 119-20.
50 Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd en bane 483 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973). The Fifth Circuit's first opinion in
Littlejohn was applauded by commentators: Comment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1035 (1973);
Note, 26 VAND. L. REV. 146 (1973); Note, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1349 (1973); Note, 48 IND.
L.J. 293 (1973); Note, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 204 (1972); Note, 41 CIN. L. REV. 689 (1972).
But see Note, 86 HARV. L. REV. 765 (1973). See also Shreveport Macaroni Mfg. Co. v.
FTC, 321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963); Bowman Dairy Co. v. Hedlin Dairy Co., 126 F.
Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1954), criticized in Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1956). For support
of a broad reading of Moore, see Kintner and Mayne, Interstate Commerce Require-
ment of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 58 GEO. L. REV. 1117, 1134
(1970).
1, Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116
(1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928
(1972); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969); Hiram
Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901
(1969); Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1968); Borden Co. v. FTC,
339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964); Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309
F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting).
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pretations of the principles in Moore,52 uncertainty arose concerning
the elements needed for jurisdiction under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act.
The Copp Paving case effectively resolved this uncertainty.
Although the Ninth Circuit did not mention Moore, the Supreme
Court gave a definitive reading of that case.53 The Court ruled that
the comments in Moore on the intrastate effect of a large business
waging a local price war with the assistance of profits from its inter-
state operations were dicta pertaining only to the extent of congres-
sional power under the commerce clause. In other words, the Court
in Copp Paving determined that Moore was concerned only with how
far Congress could have gone in regulating price discrimination, not
how far it actually had gone in the Robinson-Patman Amendment to
the Clayton Act. With respect to jurisdiction under § 2(a), the Copp
Paving Court impliedly ruled, therefore, that the one delivery truck
operating between Clovis, New Mexico and Farwell, Texas was
vital,55 and thereby settled the controversy engendered by Moore.
Although the Court in Copp Paving couched its decision in terms
of reaffirming well-established case precedent,56 there was more con-
fusion in the cases decided under the Robinson-Patman Act than the
Court indicated. Evidence from its legislative history, 7 subsequent
statements of its sponsors,58 and judicial decisions in the first fifteen
years of its life5" arguably indicate a broader applicability for § 2(a)
than that recognized by the Supreme Court in Copp Paving. Yet, the
Court disposed of Copp Paving without consideration of these old but
troublesome cases and arguments. Rather, the Court apparently re-
3, Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116
(1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928
(1972); Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 901 (1969); Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting).
95 S.Ct. at 401 n.17.
54 Id.
"Before Copp Paving, the percentage of business actually "in commerce" was
subjected to a de minimis test in determining whether § 2(a) could be applied. Skinner
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956); Baldwin Hills Bldg. Material Co. v.
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 202 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Although it is not
clear what percentage of Mead's business was transacted between Clover and Farwell,
the business of one bread truck would hardly have been substantial. As a result of Copp
Paving, then, the importance of the de minimis rule in determining § 2(a) jurisdiction
may be doubted.
11 95 S.Ct. at 401.
57 See, e.g., 80 CONG. REc. 9417 (1936) (the statements of Congressman Utterback,
the Patman Bill's floor manager).
W. PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 225-33 (1938).
, See cases cited in note 9 (supra.
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sponded to decisions by the lower federal courts since World War II
in which § 2(a) claims were treated with increasing suspicion," and
older precedents were ignored. Thus, Copp Paving may be seen as the
final stamp of approval on these later decisions by the lower federal
courts.
In addition to clarifying the language of § 2(a) and the meaning
of cases decided under it, Copp Paving seemingly has one particularly
important consequence for the effectiveness of the statute. By requir-
ing potential Robinson-Patman plaintiffs to show that at least one of
the purchases of which they compain has crossed a state line, the
independent retailer, or the retailing unit of a large corporation, will
find virtual exemption from § 2(a). Because most retail stores do not
have a significant" amount of sales crossing state lines, Copp Paving
seems to foreclose application of the Robinson-Patman Act to enjoin
or to punish retail price discrimination at the primary level.
Not only will the purely intrastate retailer be relieved of
Robinson-Patman liability by the Copp Paving decision, but the
large, vertically integrated corporation composed of manufacturing,
distributing and retailing units will also find Robinson-Patman lia-
bility easier to avoid. Before Copp Paving, several circuits had denied
Robinson-Patman liability in cases where price discrimination was
shown because the high and low priced sales came from two separate
units of the same corporation.2 The rationale was usually that in such
a situation, independent units of one corporation were simply re-
sponding to separate market conditions. Because the issue was de-
cided at the jurisdictional level, however, the question of whether the
large defendant corporation was in fact financing intrastate price
discrimination with interstate profits, rather than responding to dif-
ferent market circumstances, was not answered.
By adopting a strict reading of the Moore opinion, the Supreme
Court in Copp seems to have affirmed these circuit court decisions
by denying the validity of the argument that § 2(a) jurisdiction exists
where the discriminatory price was financed with profits obtained
10 The conflicting policies between the anti-trust laws and the Robinson-Patman
Act, see note 33 supra, seem to have been reflected in the courts' acceptance or denial
of jurisdiction under § 2(a). The need to protect businesses decreased as economic
prosperity followed the Second World War, and the courts' attitude toward jurisdiction
under the Robinson-Patman Act changed accordingly. Rowe, The Evolution of the
Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1088
(1957).
" For a discussion of the relation of the de minimis rule to § 2(a) jurisdiction, see
note 55 supra.
6 See, e.g., Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963).
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from interstate commerce. The impact of this is arguably that a
corporation which is engaged in interstate commerce itself will not be
liable for a treble-damage Robinson-Patman claim or subject to a
Federal Trade Commission injunction unless one of its units makes
discriminatory sales across a state line. By eliminating sales crossing
state lines from any one sales outlet, Copp Paving seems to permit
even the largest and most aggressive corporations to circumvent the
Robinson-Patman Act.63 On the other hand, the decision subjects
selling units in towns which straddle state boundaries to a much
higher chance of primary-line Robinson-Patman liability.6 Although
the economic policies underlying the Robinson-Patman Act have
never been clear,6 5 it seems unlikely that Congress intended this
somewhat bizarre result. However, any frustration of congressional
policy by the ruling in Copp Paving can hardly be attributed to the
Court since it appears to have allowed the literal meaning of statutory
language to control its decision. If the literal reading of the Robinson-
Patman Act by the Copp Paving Court impairs the congressional
purpose underlying its enactmant, a legislative reconsideration of
that statute's purpose and drafting would seem in order. Following
Copp Paving, then, the enigma of the Robinson-Patman Act is
squarely on Congress's doorstep.
LAWRENCE CALDWELL MELTON
See Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763, 774
(7th Cir. 1973) (Clark, J., dissenting). This point can be illustrated by considering how
§ 2(a) liability could be avoided in the Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. fact situation
under the rule in Copp Paving. If Mead had decided to wage a price war against Moore
in Santa Rosa, N.M., it could have done so with § 2(a) impunity by shipping bread
bearing the discriminatory price to Santa Rosa from its bakery in Roswell N.M. which
was about the same distance from Santa Rosa as Clovis and sufficiently ar from the
Texas border to make shipments over the state line unlikely. Not a single loaf of bread
need cross a state line in this scheme, and yet profits from Mead's widespread organi-
zation could still finance its price war. One must wonder if the judicial sanction for
this business tactic in Copp Paving is consistent with congressional policy.
64 Clayton Act § 2(a) suits have twice been successful in the Clovis, New Mex-
ico/Farwell, Texas area. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Ingram
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 259 F. Supp. 176, 178 (D.N.M. 1966). Likewise, a recent
Fifth Circuit case mentions the fact that a primary-line § 2(a) suit might meet with
success in a place like Texarcana, which straddles the Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana
borders. Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 210 n.4 (5th Cir. 1969).
However, the Supreme Court has expressed disapproval of using the commerce clause
of the Constitution for regulating purely local businesses which maintain delivery
services in cities located on state lines. NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23, 25
(1941).
63 See note 33 supra.
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